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We	Don’t	Know	How	Democracies	Die
Since	the	election	of	Donald	Trump,	many	have	expressed	their	concern	that	the	United
States	could	slip	into	an	authoritarian	backslide.	Emily	Holland	and	Hadas	Aron	react	to
this	claim,	most	notably	asserted	in	Steven	Levitsky	and	Daniel	Ziblatt’s	new	book,	‘How
Democracies	Die,’	noting	that	the	decline	of	one	of	the	most	stable,	long-lasting
democracies	in	the	world	can	only	be	compared	to	the	decline	of	other	lasting,
consolidated	democracies,	of	which	there	are	none.
How	Democracies	Die,	a	book	by	Steven	Levitsky	and	Daniel	Ziblatt,	has	been	garnering	much	attention	in	recent
weeks.	The	book	warns	about	the	possibility	of	a	slide	into	American	authoritarianism	and	draws	lessons	from	the
collapse	of	democracies	around	the	world.	This	new	release	is	part	of	an	ongoing	debate	on	whether	Donald	Trump
is	a	grave	danger	to	American	democracy.	Levitsky	and	Ziblatt	are	noted	political	scientists,	with	decades	of
important	scholarship	on	democratic	and	authoritarian	regimes.	While	the	global	review	of	cases	of	democratic
decline	is	thorough	and	accurate,	the	comparisons	they	draw	with	the	American	case	is	part	of	an	increasingly
hysterical	discourse	on	American	politics	by	liberal	commentators.	The	cases	Levitsky	and	Ziblatt	employ	shed	little
light	on	current	developments	in	American	politics,	and	they	neglect	to	identify	the	crucial	international	shifts	leading
to	democratic	decline	in	vulnerable	countries.	The	United	States	is	a	long-standing,	consolidated	democracy	and	is
not	in	immediate	danger	of	collapse.	However,	pointing	out	the	global	climate	of	democratic	decline	and	accurately
identifying	its	causes	is	an	important	task.
One	consequence	of	the	frenzied	tone	of	the	debate	on	the	fate	of	American	democracy	is	serious	conflation	of	two
separate	phenomenoma:	populism	and	regime	type.	Throughout	the	world,	populism	is	on	the	rise,	with	leaders
employing	exclusionary	and	inflammatory	demagogy,	and	challenging	liberal	norms.	Despite	its	illiberal	inclination,
populism	is	not	incompatible	with	democracy.	A	populist	political	climate	can	be	present	in	all	regime	types,	and	does
not	necessarily	involve	democratic	decline.	The	countries	that	are	most	vulnerable	to	populist	democratic	decline	are
simply	those	that	are	most	vulnerable	to	democratic	decline	in	general.	These	include	both	new	democracies	and
those	that	have	suffered	from	long-term	instability.	To	point	out	the	dangers	facing	the	United	States,	Levitsky	and
Ziblatt	discuss	cases	as	varied	as	Russia,	Poland,	Turkey,	and	Nicaragua.	Russia	and	Turkey	have	never	been
consolidated	democracies;	one	could	argue	that	they	have	never	been	democracies	at	all.	The	recent	populist	turn
experienced	in	these	states	is	simply	another	phase	on	a	long	path	of	non-democracy	and	instability.	Poland	is	a
relatively	new	democracy	and,	despite	the	rise	of	very	radical	populism,	is	still	a	democracy	by	any	measure.	It
remains	to	be	seen	whether	this	will	change	in	the	following	years,	but	classifying	Poland	as	a	non-democracy	is
simply	inaccurate.
Of	the	cases	Levitsky	and	Ziblatt	use,	the	two	most	relevant	are	those	of	Venezuela	and	Sri	Lanka.	Both	countries
transitioned	during	the	second	wave	of	democratization	in	the	post-World	War	II	era	and	remained	promising
democracies	for	several	decades.	As	they	point	out,	both	countries’	slide	into	authoritarianism	occurred	legally	within
the	framework	of	the	democratic	system.	However,	the	context	of	democratic	decline	in	both	cases	is	completely
irrelevant	to	comparison	with	the	United	States.	Venezuela	has	been	plagued	with	instability	and	coup	attempts.	In
recent	years	the	economy	became	completely	dependent	on	hydrocarbons,	and	as	a	result,	the	fate	of	the	country
became	tied	to	the	global	price	of	oil.	Sri	Lanka	suffered	from	both	the	legacies	of	colonialism	and	protracted	civil
war.	In	addition,	both	countries	are	highly	corrupt.
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In	fact	many	of	the	cases	of	democratic	backslide	pointed	out	by	Levitsky	and	Ziblatt	are	countries	that	suffer	from
endemic	corruption.	The	corruption	in	states	like	Russia,	Ukraine,	Venezuela	and	others	is	not	simply	a	flaw	of	the
system,	but	rather	it	is	the	main	feature	of	the	political	process	itself.	Corruption	is	the	means	by	which	politics	and
the	economy	are	conducted	and	is	probably	one	of	the	most	stable	institutions	in	these	states.	The	rise	of	populism
and	the	associated	increase	in	crony	capitalism	has	increased	the	opportunities	for	transnational	corruption	and	is
extremely	damaging	to	democratic	processes.	But	this	type	of	corruption	is	fundamentally	different	from	concerns
over	corruption	in	the	American	political	system.	To	be	sure,	President	Trump’s	refusal	to	disentangle	his	business
interests	from	his	office	erodes	trust	in	American	institutions.	Campaign	finance	is	in	need	of	profound	reform,	but
there	is	no	comparison	between	the	over	representation	of	capital	in	the	American	political	system	and	capital	being
the	political	system.	Endemic	corruption	is	particularly	dangerous	to	democracies	because	it	leaves	them	vulnerable
to	backroom	deals,	a	lack	of	transparency,	and	capitulation	to	the	highest	bidder.
Looking	at	demagogue	leaders	and	deeply	polarized	political	systems	can	shed	light	on	the	current	state	of	American
politics.	Certainly	President	Trump	has	disrespect	for	the	norms	of	democracy	and	continues	to	foment	polarizing
sentiments.	This	political	climate	makes	it	difficult	to	make	decisions	through	compromise	as	the	Madisonian	model
intended.	Trump	is	driving	American	politics	away	from	liberal	norms	of	tolerance,	freedom	of	the	press,	and	judicial
independence.	This	is	clearly	troubling	and	deserves	attention,	but	does	not	amount	to	democratic	death.	The	United
States	is	one	of	the	most	stable,	long-lasting	democracies	in	the	world.	As	such	it	is	not	exceptional,	but	it	is
comparable	in	regards	to	democratic	death	only	to	other	long-lasting,	stable	democracies.	History	does	not	provide
us	with	examples	of	the	death	of	long-lasting,	stable	democracies.
We	don’t	know	how	consolidated	democracies	die,	but	we	do	know	how	empires	and	world	systems	collapse.
Empires	collapse	when	power	shifts	in	a	different	direction	and	they	cannot	adjust	to	new	technological,	economic,
and	military	circumstances.	It	is	unclear	if	we	are	in	the	midst	of	a	fundamental	shift	in	the	world	order,	but	we
certainly	should	be	paying	attention	to	the	signs.	In	the	past	decade,	Russia	has	been	playing	an	increasingly
assertive	role	on	the	world	stage.	China	has	been	expanding	its	diplomatic	efforts	throughout	the	globe,	and	is	now
an	economic	powerhouse,	and	a	technological	and	environmental	leader.	The	most	notable	arena	for	this	global	shift
in	power	is	the	Syrian	Civil	War,	where	the	United	States	has	capitulated	to	Russian	interests,	reinforcing	Russia’s
aggressive	tactics.	Most	significantly,	both	Russia	and	China	offer	an	alternative	model	of	governance	to	Western
liberal	democracy.	The	model	has	already	been	emulated	by	multiple	populist	governments	including	Hungary,	India,
and	Turkey.	Here	lies	the	great	danger	of	the	populist	turn:	the	battleground	is	vulnerable	democracies,	and	the
United	States	is	consciously	neglecting	its	role	as	a	defender	of	democracy.	In	this,	President	Trump	continues
President	Obama’s	turn	towards	isolationism,	and	the	consequences	of	the	US	withdrawal	from	world	leadership	are
only	now	beginning	to	emerge.	Levitsky	and	Ziblatt	rightly	identify	the	severe	consequences	of	American
isolationism,	but	their	analysis	fails	to	identify	the	problem.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
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